If It Can Work, It Can Fight: The Case for Domestic Humanoid Robotics Manufacturing
Paper 2 Fortress America
Note: This piece was revised on 6/17/2026 after additional fact-checking — absolutist sourcing language in Section 1 was corrected, the national standard system date in Section 3 was updated, the congressional committee name in Section 2 was corrected, and the Conclusion was reframed to attribute the domestic manufacturing imperative to documented institutional behavior rather than the author’s standpoint. The “fighting in Ukraine” language was also corrected to reflect the documented deployment status. Full text and PDF below reflect v1.1.
IF IT CAN WORK, IT CAN FIGHT
The Case for Domestic Humanoid Robotics Manufacturing
Author: Adam Wood | Publication: Blue Collar Analytics | Series: Fortress America, Paper II | Date: June 2026 | Version: 1.1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States has seen this before. Corporate offshoring of semiconductor manufacturing created a strategic vulnerability that took decades to recognize and billions in legislative spending to begin correcting. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 was not innovation — it was remediation. The same structural error is now repeating in humanoid robotics, in accelerated form, with a state-backed Chinese competitor that has explicitly declared its intention to dominate the global market before American firms establish scale.
This paper argues that the Fortress America institutional framework — the same pattern of bipartisan policy response that produced the CHIPS Act — will produce an equivalent legislative and manufacturing response to the robotics challenge. It must. Because a robot that can work a factory floor can walk a battlefield, and that reality makes domestic manufacturing not an economic preference but a defense requirement.
The technology is here. The threat is documented in congressional testimony. Humanoid robots are already deployed on an active battlefield. What remains is execution — and this paper maps the argument for why execution is not only necessary but institutionally inevitable.
SECTION 1 — THE PRECEDENT: HOW AMERICA LEARNED THE HARD WAY
The pattern now emerging in humanoid robotics has played out before. For decades, American corporations offshored semiconductor manufacturing to cheaper economies, optimizing for cost per unit in an era when Pax Americana made strategic vulnerability feel theoretical. The semiconductor was invented in the United States, and America retained its lead in research and development — but ceded the physical manufacturing base that turns innovation into strategic power (White House, 2024).
The consequence took years to fully register. By the time policymakers acted, the United States had declined from producing roughly 40% of global semiconductors in 1990 to approximately 12% today, with none of the most advanced chips manufactured domestically (CFR, 2024). The remediation response was the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 — $280 billion in authorized spending, combining the Endless Frontier Act’s investment in domestic research with the CHIPS for America Act’s manufacturing incentives, specifically designed to compete with China (Conference Board, 2025). The CHIPS R&D Office is investing $11 billion into a domestic R&D ecosystem while the CHIPS Program Office dedicates $39 billion to manufacturing incentives (NIST, 2026).
The lesson is not that offshoring is always wrong. The lesson is that offshoring strategic industries creates dependencies that adversaries can and will weaponize. China demonstrated this with precision when it imposed export controls on rare earth magnets in April 2025 — a licensing regime targeting high-performance magnet grades containing dysprosium and terbium, the specific compounds required for advanced robotics actuators, EV motors, and defense applications. This is not a blanket ban; it is a targeted chokehold on the performance tier advanced manufacturing actually requires, with a discretionary licensing process that functions as a second lever even on technically permitted shipments. Each Optimus humanoid robot requires approximately 3.5 kilograms of NdFeB magnets — with China controlling approximately 85 to 90% of global NdFeB production and approximately 70% of the Optimus component supply chain by value share — making the export control regime the single largest production risk in American humanoid robotics in 2026 (Optimusk, 2026; 36kr, 2026). The semiconductor playbook and the robotics playbook are identical. The question is whether America corrects the error before or after the damage compounds.
SECTION 2 — THE BOSTON DYNAMICS PROBLEM: WE BUILT IT AND SOLD IT
The convergence of artificial intelligence and humanoid robotics represents the most significant technological transition since the microprocessor. The defense establishment recognized this early. DARPA funded Boston Dynamics through 57 government contracts totaling nearly $200 million between 2008 and 2025, with Atlas — the primary American humanoid robotics platform — developed under direct DARPA oversight, with components produced by Sandia National Laboratories and iRobot (Science Arena, 2025; Wikipedia, 2026). This was not venture capital. This was public investment in a strategic defense technology.
Then the same pattern that hollowed out semiconductor manufacturing repeated itself. Boston Dynamics was sold to Google, then to SoftBank, and in June 2021 was acquired by Hyundai Motor Group for $1.1 billion — giving the South Korean automotive conglomerate an 80% controlling interest in the primary American defense-originated humanoid robotics platform (Hyundai, 2021). The technology American taxpayers funded through DARPA is now majority owned by a foreign corporation.
Unlike the semiconductor crisis, however, policymakers this time are sounding the alarm before the damage fully compounds. The Humanoid ROBOT Act of 2025 was introduced in the Senate, prohibiting defense contractors from using humanoid robots designed or manufactured by adversarial foreign entities and requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on national security threats posed by humanoid robots in countries of concern (Congress.gov, 2025). The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act includes provisions directing the Army to expand robotic automation in munitions manufacturing (Holland & Knight, 2025). The Special Competitive Studies Project issued a memo to the President explicitly calling for U.S. independent leadership in robotics and prevention of Chinese firms dominating the robotics stack (SCSP, 2025). Congressional testimony from March 2026 documented China’s robotics strategy from Made in China 2025 through the 14th Five Year Robotics Plan and the 2023 Robotics Plus action plan — all identifying robotics as strategic military-civil fusion technology (House Homeland Security Committee, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, 2026).
The institutional alarm is sounding. The legislative framework is forming. The question is whether it moves fast enough.
SECTION 3 — THE CHINESE STRATEGIC THREAT: MARKET DOMINANCE AND SUPPLY CHAIN COERCION
This paper does not argue that conflict with China is inevitable or desirable. The economic entanglement between the two nations is real and mutual destruction is not a rational outcome for either. What this paper argues is simpler and more documented: competitive desire to dominate strategic technology markets does not yield to common sense, and China has demonstrated both the intent and the capability to pursue robotics dominance through means that go beyond market competition.
The scale of China’s state-directed robotics push is without precedent in this technology sector. More than 140 Chinese manufacturers launched over 330 humanoid robot models in 2025 alone, described by Chinese authorities as the first year of mass production (Xinhua, 2026). China released its first national standard system for humanoid robots on March 3, 2026, covering the full industrial chain and lifecycle of humanoid robotics — a regulatory architecture designed to entrench domestic manufacturers and marginalize foreign competitors (AI Insider, 2026). The Jamestown Foundation documented that a single Beijing-registered humanoid robotics firm can simultaneously access over a dozen distinct policy support tools from one local government entity alone (Jamestown, 2026).
The price signal is the most visible manifestation of this strategy. Unitree Robotics launched its R1 humanoid at $5,900 in July 2025 — a price point previously considered years from viability — backed by RMB 76 million ($11 million) in tax incentives in the first nine months of 2025 alone, and RMB 32 million ($4.7 million) in direct government grants received cumulatively between 2022 and September 2025, as disclosed in Unitree’s own IPO prospectus (Jamestown, 2026). This is not organic market competition. It is state-subsidized price destruction designed to capture market share before American firms reach manufacturing scale.
The coercive dimension of the strategy is more significant than the price competition. China’s imposition of export controls on rare earth magnets in April 2025 demonstrated that supply chain weaponization is not a theoretical risk — it is an executed policy. Chinese manufacturers currently constitute approximately 70% of Tesla’s Optimus supply chain by component share (36kr, 2026). The export control regime did not just threaten future production — it created an immediate production constraint on the leading American humanoid robotics manufacturer. Market strategy and supply chain coercion operating simultaneously represent a more sophisticated competitive threat than American firms faced in semiconductors. The window for a corrective legislative response is open. It will not remain open indefinitely.
SECTION 4 — IF IT CAN WORK, IT CAN FIGHT
Mainstream media coverage of humanoid robotics has framed this technology primarily as a factory worker story — a labor displacement narrative focused on manufacturing productivity. That framing is not false. It is incomplete in ways that matter enormously for policy.
Humanoid robots are already deployed on a battlefield. Two Phantom MK-1 units — developed by San Francisco-based startup Foundation — were deployed to Ukraine in February 2026 for frontline reconnaissance and logistics support in hazardous areas, in trials conducted with direct U.S. government support (Interesting Engineering, 2026). Foundation has secured $24 million in confirmed contracts across the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to evaluate robotic systems for inspection, logistics, and weapons-related tasks (Interesting Engineering, 2026). Foundation’s CEO has stated publicly that the company’s goal is for humanoid robots to be the first to enter dangerous missions, potentially carrying lethal weapons while keeping human soldiers out of immediate harm’s way (Reuters, 2026).
The Pentagon is not waiting for the technology to mature before committing resources. In July 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a memorandum directing all service branches to accelerate acquisition of drone and robotic systems, establish dedicated robotic units within each service branch by FY2027, and increase funding for human-machine teaming research by 40% (Robozaps, 2026). The Pentagon’s Defense Autonomous Working Group budget is proposed to increase from $226 million to $54 billion under the FY2027 spending proposal — an increase of nearly 240 times in a single budget cycle (Defense One, 2026).
The historical pattern is consistent and unbroken. Military technology does not wait for perfection before deployment. The airplane was fabric and wood when armies mounted guns on it and began dropping bombs. The energy density limitations of current humanoid robot batteries, the payload constraints, the endurance gaps — these are the fabric and wood of 1914. They will be solved or worked around because the strategic imperative demands it. Tethered power systems and high-capacity battery loads represent near-term viable solutions for fixed battlefield and logistics support roles even before full autonomous energy independence is achieved.
What the deployment record in Ukraine and the Pentagon budget signals confirm is that this technology has already crossed the threshold from research to operational reality. The question for American policymakers is not whether humanoid robots will serve on a battlefield. The documented record confirms they already do. The question is whether the robots deployed for America will be built in America — or whether they will be built with Chinese components, in Chinese-owned factories, dependent on Chinese rare earth supply chains that Beijing has already demonstrated willingness to restrict.
SECTION 5 — THE AMERICAN MANUFACTURING IMPERATIVE
The legislative framework for a domestic response is already forming. The Humanoid ROBOT Act, the FY2026 NDAA robotics provisions, and the Special Competitive Studies Project presidential memo collectively represent the early institutional signal pattern that preceded the CHIPS Act — the same Fortress America bipartisan convergence around a recognized strategic vulnerability.
The domestic manufacturing anchor most capable of responding at scale is Tesla. Tesla’s SEC filings confirm that preparations for the first large-scale Optimus production facility at Fremont are underway, with a first-generation line designed for one million robots per year, and Gigafactory Texas being prepared for a second-generation line designed for long-term annual production capacity of ten million robots (Tesla SEC Filing, 2026). Over 1,000 Gen 3 Optimus units are already deployed internally across Tesla’s own manufacturing operations — the most advanced real-world deployment of humanoid robots in American industrial history (Tesla SEC Filing, 2026).
However, the supply chain reality must be stated plainly. Chinese manufacturers currently constitute approximately 70% of the Optimus component supply chain. The Shanghai Gigafactory — not Fremont or Texas — has been identified by Tesla’s own China president as the primary production site for achieving Optimus scale, citing China’s manufacturing system as the key to solving mass production challenges (BigGo Finance, 2026). This is not a solved problem. It is the problem the legislative response must address — and it mirrors precisely the dynamic that made the CHIPS Act necessary.
Tesla has already begun responding to supply chain weaponization without waiting for legislation. The Terafab initiative — announced March 21, 2026 — is Tesla’s in-house semiconductor fabrication program, a direct response to chip supply risk for both Cybercab and Optimus production (Optimusk, 2026). Alternative NdFeB magnet supply chains are being pursued in the United States and Australia in direct response to China’s April 2025 export controls (Optimusk, 2026). The corporate response to supply chain coercion is already underway. Legislative support — on the CHIPS Act model — would accelerate what market forces alone cannot complete fast enough.
The domestic rare earth supply chain is the foundation everything else rests on. MP Materials, currently the only operational rare earth mining and processing facility of scale in the United States, sits at the critical intersection of the Fortress America resource consolidation thesis and the humanoid robotics manufacturing imperative. A robot built in Texas with American rare earth magnets processed in California is a fundamentally different strategic asset than a robot assembled in Fremont with Chinese components that Beijing can restrict on short notice.
The manufacturing imperative is not complicated. Build the robot. Source the components domestically. Secure the supply chain. The CHIPS Act demonstrated that American institutional will can accomplish this when the strategic necessity is recognized. The deployment of humanoid robots in Ukraine, the $54 billion autonomous systems budget proposal, and the Chinese rare earth export control regime have collectively made the strategic necessity undeniable. The only remaining question is the speed of execution.
CONCLUSION
The United States does not have a robotics problem. It has a pattern problem. The same sequence that created semiconductor dependency — offshore for cost, cede manufacturing, discover the strategic vulnerability too late — is repeating in humanoid robotics with one critical difference: the warning signs are visible in real time and the legislative response has already begun.
A humanoid robot is already deployed on a battlefield in Ukraine. The Pentagon is proposing a $54 billion autonomous systems budget. China has imposed export controls on the rare earth materials that power humanoid actuators and state-subsidized competitors to a $5,900 price point that American manufacturers cannot match without domestic supply chain support. The Humanoid ROBOT Act is in the Senate. The NDAA has robotics provisions. The SCSP has sent a memo to the President.
The Fortress America institutional framework — the bipartisan convergence of defense necessity, legislative response, and domestic manufacturing investment — is already initiating around robotics exactly as this paper’s framework predicts. The CHIPS Act was remediation for a strategic error that took decades to correct. The robotics response has the opportunity to be prevention.
The institutional response already reflects a single coherent logic. The CHIPS Act, the Humanoid ROBOT Act, the FY2026 NDAA robotics provisions, and the $54 billion DAWG budget are collectively the documented expression of an institutional judgment that what is deployed for America’s defense must be built on American supply chains. This paper has mapped the pattern, the vulnerability, and the response already forming across successive administrations and both political parties. Whether the response moves fast enough is the only remaining open question.
If it can work, it can fight. The institutions are already acting on that logic. This paper has simply read the blueprint.
REFERENCES
U.S. Legislation & Federal Policy
CHIPS and Science Act (2022). Public Law 117-167. U.S. Congress. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47523
Conference Board (2025, March 13). The Future of the CHIPS and Science Act. https://www.conference-board.org/research/ced-policy-backgrounders/the-future-of-the-CHIPS-and-Science-Act
Congress.gov (2025). S.3275 - Humanoid ROBOT Act of 2025. 119th Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/3275/text
Holland & Knight (2025, December). FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act: A Comprehensive Analysis. https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/12/fy-2026-national-defense-authorization-act
NIST (2026, January 21). CHIPS for America. National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://www.nist.gov/chips
White House (2024, August 9). Fact Sheet: Two Years after the CHIPS and Science Act. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/08/09/fact-sheet-two-years-after-the-chips-and-science-act
Defense & Military Sources
Defense One (2026, May 4). Pentagon seeks smarter, self-organizing drones as autonomous-warfare budget is poised to skyrocket. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2026/05/pentagon-drones-autonomous-warfare/413323/
House Homeland Security Committee, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee (2026, March 17). Examining the National Security Risks of PRC Artificial Intelligence. Congressional Testimony. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM08/20260317/118982/HHRG-119-HM08-Wstate-DoshiPhDR-20260317.pdf
Interesting Engineering (2026). Humanoid robot trialed as soldier in deadly Ukrainian battlefield. https://interestingengineering.com/ai-robotics/humanoid-robot-battlefield-ukraine
Interesting Engineering (2025, December 17). US firm Foundation plans to build 50,000 humanoid robots by 2027. https://interestingengineering.com/military/us-foundation-build-50000-humanoid-robots
Reuters / CNBC (2026, May 30). This Trump-linked startup plans to put humanoid robots in the military. https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2026/05/30/humanoid-robots-ukraine-war-foundation-military-ai.html
Robozaps (2026). Humanoid Robots in Military and Defense. https://blog.robozaps.com/b/humanoid-robots-in-military-and-defense
SCSP / Special Competitive Studies Project (2025, February). Memos to the President: National Robotics Strategy. https://www.scsp.ai/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Robotics-Memo.pdf
China & Geopolitical Sources
AI Insider (2026, March 1). China Releases National Standards for Humanoid Robotics and Embodied AI. https://theaiinsider.tech/2026/03/01/china-releases-national-standards-for-humanoid-robotics-and-embodied-ai/
Jamestown Foundation (2026, April 18). Policy Support for Robotics Firms Shows Defense Integration. https://jamestown.org/policy-support-for-robotics-firms-shows-defense-integration/
36kr English (2025, October 15). Elon Musk Places $685M Order with Sanhua: China Becomes Key Supplier for Optimus. https://eu.36kr.com/en/p/3510288514980998
36kr English (2026, April 24). Elon Musk’s Plan to Build One Million Robots: How Many Motors, Reducers, and Lead Screws Are Made in China? https://eu.36kr.com/en/p/3780414717129481
Boston Dynamics & Robotics History
Hyundai Motor Group (2021, June 21). Hyundai Motor Group Completes Acquisition of Boston Dynamics from SoftBank. https://www.hyundai.com/worldwide/en/newsroom/detail/hyundai-motor-group-completes-acquisition-of-boston-dynamics-from-softbank-0000000516
Science Arena (2025, September 8). Invisible state: How government contracts created Boston Dynamics. https://www.sciencearena.org/en/columns/invisible-state-how-government-contracts-created-boston-dynamics/
Wikipedia (2026). Atlas (robot). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_(robot)
Tesla & Domestic Manufacturing
BigGo Finance (2026, April 16). Tesla Plans Mass Production of Humanoid Robots at Shanghai Gigafactory. https://finance.biggo.com/news/fmJ4lp0BZk7xib5fQwHY
CFR / Council on Foreign Relations (2024). The CHIPS Act: How U.S. Microchip Factories Could Reshape the Economy. https://www.cfr.org/articles/chips-act-how-us-microchip-factories-could-reshape-economy
Optimusk (2026). Tesla Optimus Supply Chain: Who Makes the Parts? https://optimusk.blog/blog/tesla-optimus-suppliers/
Tesla SEC Filing (2026, Q1). Form 8-K, Quarterly Results. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001318605/000162828026026551/exhibit991.htm
Tesla SEC Filing (2026, FY2025 Annual). Form 8-K, Annual Results. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001318605/000162828026003837/exhibit991.htm
FORTRESS AMERICA SERIES
Paper I: Fortress America — Hemispheric Consolidation, Infrastructure Cascades, and the Regional Transformation of the American Economy
Paper II: If It Can Work, It Can Fight — The Case for Domestic Humanoid Robotics Manufacturing
Paper III: Forthcoming
DISCLAIMER: This paper represents independent analytical and systems research and is the second in the Blue Collar Analytics Fortress America series. Nothing contained herein constitutes financial advice, investment recommendations, or legal counsel. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making investment decisions.
